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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Kissinger: A Capitol Problem

The administration's failure to reverse Congress on Turkish aid leads to an inescapable conclusion with far-reaching implications: The tragic, perhaps irreversible break in the U.S.-Turkish alliance quite likely would not have occurred if Dr. Henry A. Kissinger were not Secretary of State.

The direct cause for Congress irresponsibility cutting off aid to Turkey is the brazen pressure campaign of the Greek-American lobby. But ethnic politics would not have been enough. What provided the margin of defeat was Dr. Kissinger. Feeling he had transformed Turkish aid into a test of who runs foreign policy, some liberal Democrats were tilted against Turkish aid. Even more damaging, rabidly anti-Communist Republicans opposed aid because of Kissinger's detentist foreign policy.

While not condoning such motives, Republican congressional leaders blame Kissinger for the Turkish debacle. Some even feel his usefulness as Secretary of State has ended, a view now shared by a few officials in the administration. These still anonymous critics are not Kissinger-haters of the far left or far right but responsible Ford supporters who until recently considered Kissinger indispensible.

President Ford views Kissinger as his most valuable adviser and wants him at the State Department through 1976, raising this question: What to do with a Secretary of State whose presence on Capitol Hill hurts more than helps in a Congress wildly assertive about foreign policy?

When Congress ended Turkish aid last December because of the Cyprus problem, Kissinger still cut a masterful figure on Capitol Hill. But Turkish aid quickly became personalized between four highly intense personalities—Kissinger on one side and three champions of the Greek lobby on the other: Reps. John Brademas of Indiana, Benjamin Rosenthal of New York and Paul Sarbanes of Maryland.

Matters grew worse Feb. 11 when the three congressmen visited Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who suggested a compromise to conceivably break the impasse. The congressmen reported this to Kissinger, who gave them the impression of resenting Schlesinger's interference. Indeed, such resentment was promptly relayed from the State Department to the Defense Department.

At that point, Brademas and his colleagues hardened their conclusion — erroneous or not—that Kissinger was more interested in executive branch dominance over foreign policy than in compromising the Turkish people.

Nevertheless, the administration's position improved through spring and early summer as the Turkish aid cutoff failed to soften Ankara's position on Cyprus. Lobbying to reverse the House, Kissinger met late July 9 with the huge Democratic freshman class of 75 members.

The results were disastrous. Some freshmen felt Kissinger was condescending in declaring that "you politicians" ought to understand motives of the Turkish leaders. Others felt him arrogant in asserting executive domination over foreign policy. Rep. Abner Mikva of Illinois, more experienced and usually calmer than his freshman colleagues, entered the meeting leaning toward support of aid; he left opposed, fearful that Kissinger intended the issue as "the opening wedge to drive Congress out of foreign policy."

Even so, the administration would have won had Republicans held firm. They did not. The 223 to 206 defeat was authored by 39 Republican defections, 27 of them conservatives. Voting against the President were the vanguard of the right wing, including Reps. John Ashbrook of Ohio, Robert Bauman and Marjorie Holt of Maryland, John Rousselot of California and Philip Crane of Illinois. The underlying reason: Kissinger.

On the floor before the July 24 vote, conservatives told Republican leaders that if Henry Kissinger was for something, they were against it. They did not trust him, they added, and were bitter about detente, Helsinki, Cuba and the Panama Canal.

When Schlesinger met with the 39 recalcitrant Republicans July 30, they began denouncing Kissinger. Schlesinger refused to get into any discussion of his cabinet colleague and rival, instead stressing the adverse effects against U.S. national security from closing Turkish bases.

That turned around several anti-Communist Republicans, but nobody could absolutely guarantee a reversal in the House. So, Congress left town Aug. 1, to be idle for a full month in which U.S.-Turkish relations will grow more poisoned. Even a reversal on aid after Congress returns in September (by no means certain) would not unscramble the Turkish eggs.

Should Dr. Kissinger now stay out of the firing line on this issue? Beyond Turkish aid, should he abandon congressional duties and stick to diplomacy? But handling Congress has been part of a Secretary of State's basic duties for a generation.

Thus, the President must decide whether Dr. Kissinger's talents in negotiating with the Communists and in the Mideast outweigh his now obvious liabilities in Congress. Mr. Ford obviously thinks so, but some Republican congressional leaders may soon tell him they do not agree.

Garry Wills

Kissinger About-faces on Talks Criticism

As fairly often happens, the most ironic comment on Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's present actions is to be found in Mr. Kissinger's former pronouncements. Back in the 1950's, he was a caustic analyst of personal diplomacy and summit meetings.

In fact, Mr. Kissinger inadvertently torpedoed the efforts of Nelson A. Rockefeller at the presidency.

In 1959, Mr. Kissinger elaborated an attack on then President Eisenhower's diplomacy that closely resembled John F. Kennedy's later campaign positions. But that meant that Mr. Rockefeller, no favorite of his own party's Taft wing, was criticizing the Dewey wing as well.

It surprised Mr. Rockefeller that no Eastern establishment money was shaken loose for him after his carping at Mr. Eisenhower. His whiz kid from Harvard had given him a weapon that exploded in his hand.

All that is forgotten now. Mr. Kissinger has engaged in a personal diplomacy that makes John Foster Dulles look, in retrospect, like a hermit sitting in his cell. And Mr. Kissinger seems to like nothing better than showy international gatherings. In the 1950's, he said that such meetings should take place only when major new positions were being adopted. Now he defends the Helsinki gathering on the grounds that it does not really matter—de facto recognition of borders is not a treaty bestowing full legitimacy. Back then, he opposed meetings that just confirmed the status quo. Now he argues that Helsinki is needed because it will do nothing but accept again the already accepted.

He's wrong, of course. And to see why, we should look even farther back in his own writings, to his treatment of the Congress of Vienna in "A World Restored."

He sets forth, in that book, two basic norms for negotiating with a revolutionary power. one should make minimal demands. These might tempt the revolutionary power to accept negotiations, with all its implications of contractual legitimacy. It is more likely, however, that the revolutionary power will reject even the most modest demands, confirming its revolutionary threat in the eyes of remaining doubters around the world.

When dealing with legitimate powers, Mr. Kissinger argued, maximum demands should be made, since negotiatory whittling at these is to be expected. Mr. Kissinger often seems to be hard on friends and nice toward enemies. The rules he worked out in his book help explain that tendency.

The important thing to note is that Mr. Kissinger, while talking about a normalization of relations, is still using the strategy on Russia he prescribed for revolutionary powers; that this, minimal demands with regard to trade, Jewish emigration, recognized borders, arms limitation and inspection.

Mr. Kissinger is, in effect, making no demands at all; the initiative has been Russia's all along. This represents a complete reversal of his own early precepts.

If Mr. Kissinger reversed himself on personal diplomacy, on summit meetings, on tactical nuclear warfare, we should not be surprised that he has abandoned his first and deepest conviction about the way to accomplish legitimacy.

For that is, in fact, what Helsinki is meant to accomplish. Our agreement admits Russia into the stable world order we mean to preserve.

Some will consider this an Unholy Alliance—unlike the Holy Alliance formed after the Congress of Vienna. And Mr. Kissinger himself will speak at times of Russia as a revolutionary power rather

following its initiatives?